Dworkin\u27s Rights Thesis: Implications for the Relationship Between the Legal Order and the Moral Order by Baker, Livingston
BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 4 Article 7
11-1-1980
Dworkin's Rights Thesis: Implications for the
Relationship Between the Legal Order and the
Moral Order
Livingston Baker
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Livingston Baker, Dworkin's Rights Thesis: Implications for the Relationship Between the Legal Order and the Moral Order, 1980 BYU L.
Rev. 837 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss4/7
Dworkin's Rights Thesis: Implications for the 
Relationship Between the Legal Order and the 
Moral Order 
Livingston Baker * 
A. The Invitation 
I have just received a formal invitation from "Archbishop" 
Dworkin to join his "Order." This invitation is disquieting. I am 
being asked to give up the predominant Order of Archbishop 
Hart, in whose modest vineyards I have labored since seminary. 
One cannot be lightly asked to give up loyalty to a process, a 
methodology, and a philosophy that has become comfortable 
and convincing and that has been passed on by earlier genera- 
tions that labored diligently and competently in constructing it. 
I have spoken to others who have received the same invita- 
tion and have observed a variety of reactions. Many are comfort- 
able in their present orders. Several, especially those in the 
Order of Hart, wish to remain with an order whose success has 
been proven. A few, however, are curious enough to listen, but 
must be persuaded. 
I am in the latter group. While I consider the invitation on 
its own merits, it is worth examining the effect it may produce 
should Archbishop Dworkin's thesis turn out to be so attractive 
as to swell the ranks of his new order. There is evidence that he 
is mining a rich vein of discontent with the prevailing orders of 
our time. His rights thesis reflects a trend to focus on the need 
for moral argument to resolve difficult and puzzling legal 
problems. 
B. Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously 
Professor Ronald Dworkin has introduced, developed and 
spiritedly defended a fresh way to look at law-a rights-based 
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School. B.A., 1958, Yale 
University; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan; L.L.M., 1975, New York University. 
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theory of law. He has packaged the evolution of his general the- 
ory in a single volume, Taking Rights Seriously,l which has 
drawn widespread and serious attention. The criticism of Dwor- 
kin's theory has been particularly valuable in unraveling some of 
its complexities and in adding useful insights and variations.' 
However, this essay examines not only the theory itself but also 
its implications for society-the shaping of social forces by legal 
norms and vice versa. 
What justifies such attention at  this time? One justification 
is the growing popularity of Dworkin's theory. There has been a 
discernible trend in American political and legal thinking during 
the last two decades toward theory-building in terms of individ- 
ual rights.' Dworkin contributes to and plays a recognized lead- 
ing role in this growing trend. He is challenging prevailing theo- 
ries of law, such as positivism and realism, with a new and 
comprehensive rights theory. His theory has the potential of be- 
ing assimilated into both the legal order and society at large. 
Thus, those concerned with the legal order and the moral order 
should begin to take account of the implications Dworkin's 
rights thesis may raise for the legal and moral orders and the 
relationship between them. 
Dworkin has based his theory on a number of independent 
legal concepts. This essay focuses on a concept that plays a key 
role in his rights thesis-the sharp distinction between princi- 
ples and p~ l i c i e s .~  
1. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS ERIOUSLY (1977). A later edition included an appen- 
dix, not in the 1977 edition, which is an expanded version of Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 
GA. L. REV. 1201 (1977). See R. DWORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (paperback ed. 
1978) [hereinafter cited as R. DWORIUN]. 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY is a collection of essays which, except for the last two 
chapters, were written over the previous decade. The last chapter, chapter 13, was re- 
vised and expanded in Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1978). 
2. Dworkin's work has spawned a secondary industry of jurisprudential reaction to 
his rights thesis. See generally Jurisprzufence Symposium, 11 GA. L. REV. (1977); Regan, 
Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1213 (1978); 
Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously: Reflections on Dworkin and the 
American Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1265 (1977); GrifEths, Book Review, 
53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1124 (1978). 
3. See generally C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971). 
4. Although Dworkin's distinction between principles and policies has received some 
critical attention, the only extended analysis is an attack by Greenawalt. Greenawalt, 
Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977). See also Regan, supra 
note 2, at 1254-61. 
DWORKIN'S RIGHTS THESIS 
Dworkin relies on the distinction between principles and 
policies for both his descriptive and normative account of the 
operation of a legal system. According to this distinction, a court 
does in fact and quite properly should prefer arguments of prin- 
ciple to arguments of policy when considering and giving reasons 
for a decision (particularly in a hard case). The early evidence 
indicates that this distinction and its uses are likely to become 
the subject of disagreement among lawyers and judges.' One rea- 
son for this controversy is that others simply will not agree with 
Dworkin's description of what judges in fact do or have charac- 
teristically done.. Another reason is Dworkin's normative claim 
that judges ought not to take account of policy considerations. 
The rights thesis provides that judges are political officials 
who enforce existing political rights.' Dworkin's "doctrine of po- 
litical responsibility" reflects his insistence that " Uludicial deci- 
sions are political decisions.'" He rejects the prevailing positivis- 
tic view that if a judge reaches a novel case in an area covered 
by legislation, then the judge should and does act as a deputy 
legislature, taking into account policy considerations.@ The doc- 
trine of political responsibility demands "articulate consis- 
tency." This consistency is not easily satisfied by arguments of 
policy, but is satisfied by arguments of principle which provide 
"distributional consistency from one case to the next."1° While 
efforts to distinguish between the roles of the legislature and ju- 
5. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare a d  
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 968 (1977). Hart ventures the "prophecy" that the 
chief criticism of Dworkin will be directed at his insistence on there being one right 
answer for each legal issue addressed by a judge. However, Hart goes on to say that 
Dworkin challenges a basic theme of English jurisprudence which says that judges and 
legislators properly should take into account utilitarian concern for the general welfare in 
deciding what the law ought to be. Hart's respectful diplomacy keeps him from including 
American jurisprudence in that characterization, though to a lesser extent, clearly, he 
would agree that the characterization is fitting. 
6. See, e.g., Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of 
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL . REV. 707 (1978). Summers' analysis leads to 
"goal reasons" as one of three main types of substantive reasons that courts have tradi- 
tionally used. He acknowledges Dworkin's claim that courts do not characteristically 
base their decisions on goal reasons but concludes, "The case law, however, does not 
seem to bear him [Dworkin] out." Id. at  717 n.28. See also Brilmayer, The Institutional 
and Empirical Basis of the Rights Thesis, 11 GA. L. REV. 1173, 1180-96 (1977). 
7. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 87. 
8. Id. at 87, 88. 
9. Id. at 82. 
10. Id. at  88. 
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diciary are not new,ll Dworkin's sharp cleavage-excluding con- 
siderations of policy from judicial consideration-implies a strict 
limitation on the role of the judiciary in democratic political 
theory? 
The meaning of the principles-policies distinction has been 
explained by Dworkin on three separate occasions. He intro- 
duced the distinction in an essay written in 1967: 
I call a "policy" that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be 
reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, 
or social feature of the community (though some goals are neg- 
ative, in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be 
protected from adverse change). I call a "principle" a standard 
that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an 
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality.18 
This explanation characterizes the use of policy arguments as 
teleological in nature and the use of arguments of principle as 
deontological in nature. Thus, an argument of policy is an argu- 
ment to maximize the realization of a goal that has been selected 
for its intrinsic value. On the other hand, an argument of princi- 
ple focuses on moral considerations independent of their effect 
on any desired goal.14 It would be no more than a coincidence 
11. See, e.g., H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making 
and Application of Law (1958) (mimeograph, Harvard University). 
12. Note that one of the consequences of a rights-based theory is that rights may be 
limited only by competing rights; policy considerations cannot be used to limit rights. R. 
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  194-95, 199. 
A theory of adjudication and legislation may not necessarily match up with estab- 
lished institutions along the lines of a traditional separation of powers. That Dworkin is 
focusing on theory and not on the judiciary and legislature as institutions is a point 
made by Griffiths, supra note 2, a t  1133 n.40. 
13. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967), reprinted in R. 
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  22. 
14. Rawls uses these contrasting terms to describe utilitarianism as teleological in 
character and his own concept of justice and fairness as deontological. J. RAWLS, supra 
note 3, at 24-30. Dworkin, looking for a "deep theory" in Rawls' work, argues that it 
"must be a particular form of deontological theory, a theory that takes the idea of rights 
so seriously as to make them fundamental in political morality." R. DWORKIN, supra note 
1, at  169. 
Even if Dworkin has a preference for a deontological theory of rights in his norma- 
tive arguments, it is not required content for the conceptual framework of his rights 
thesis. He fully recognizes the role that consequentialist arguments can play in various 
theories of rights. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  313-15. His rights thesis, in its de- 
scriptive and conceptual account, does not rest on a particular theory of rights that may 
be employed. For this reason, the deontological-teleological distinction is used here only 
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for an argument of principle to advance a desirable goal; indeed 
it could well retard progress toward that goal. 
Dworkin reinforced the deontological-teleological distinction 
in 1975. In a second essay, he reexplored the central theme of 
the rights thesis-that judges have the political responsibility to 
enforce existing political rights through the use of arguments of 
principle and not arguments of policy.16 The principles-policies 
distinction played a fundamental role in developing the rights 
thesis: 
It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot be out- 
weighed by all social goals. We might, for simplicity, stipulate 
not to call any political aim a right unless it has a certain 
threshold weight against collective goals in general; unless, for 
example, it cannot be defeated by appeal to any of the ordi- 
nary routine goals of political administration, but only by a 
goal of special urgency.16 
Consideration of "a goal of special urgency" is the only room 
allowed a judge for considerations of policy. 
In addition to focusing on the deontological-teleological dif- 
ference, Dworkin outlined another key feature of the principles- 
policies distinction: 
A political right is an individuated political aim. An individual 
has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it 
counts in favor of a political decision that the decision is likely 
to advance or protect the state of affairs in which he enjoys the 
right, even when no other political aim is served and some po- 
litical aim is disserved thereby . . . . A goal is a nonindividu- 
ated political aim, that is, a state of affairs whose specification 
does not in this way call for any particular opportunity or re- 
source or liberty for particular individuals.17 
This individual-collective dichotomy suggests that the central 
focus of the judiciary is and should be the individual.18 Thus, 
for the narrow purpose of characterizing how the forms of arguments of principle and of 
policy differ essentially in terms of their relationship to the consequence of a goal. 
15. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), reprinted in R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 1, at  81-130. 
16. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  92. 
17. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted). 
18. See id. at 172. Here Dworkin argues that both right-based theories and duty- 
based theories (Kantian) "place the individual at  the center, and take his decision or 
conduct as of fundamental importance." In fact, Dworkin goes on to argue, "Right-based 
theories are, in contrast [to duty-based theories], concerned with the independence 
rather than the conformity of individual action." Id. 
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the essence of Dworkin's principles-policies distinction is found 
in two dichotomous features: deontological-teleological and indi- 
vidual-collective. 
That Dworkin considers both of these features fundamental 
to the principles-policies distinction becomes clear in his third 
explanation of the distinction. In reply to Greenawalt's attack, 
Dworkin once more tries to package a definition: 
What are arguments of principle and arguments of policy, 
and what is the difference? Arguments of principle attempt to 
justify a political decision that benefits some person or group 
by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit. 
Arguments of policy attempt to justify a decision by showing 
that, in spite of the fact that those who are benefited do not 
have a right to the benefit, providing the benefit will advance a 
collective goal of the political community. It is important not 
to confuse this distinction, between arguments of principle and 
arguments of policy, with a different distinction, which is the 
distinction between the consequentialist and non-consequen- 
tialist theories of rights.'@ 
Dworkin goes on to argue that the consideration of claimed 
rights can indeed take account of consequences, including conse- 
quences to non-parties to the dispute in question, and not lose 
their deontological character.40 
At this point, it may be well to note one other important 
feature of the rights thesis which, though somewhat implicit in 
the foregoing description, has an important bearing on our sepa- 
rate examination of the principles-policies distinction. Dworkin's 
thesis relies on the nature of argument? Principles and policies 
are not existing "things" lying around waiting to be discovered. 
For example, in an effort to show that Greenawalt and others by 
It should also be noted here that Dworkin counts legal persons such as corporations 
as individuals that may have rights. Id. at 91 n.1. Later on, in reply to the criticism of 
Greenawalt, he includes "groups" as candidates for holding rights. Id. at 294. 
19. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 294. Greenawalt's attack on the principles-policies 
distinction (supra note 4) receives the major portion of attention in Dworkin's "Appen- 
dix: A Reply to Critics." Id. at 294-330. 
20. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 294-301. 
21. Efforts to accommodate Dworkin's rights thesis to a positivist approach show a 
tendency to ignore or down play Dworkin's insistence on the role of argument as a cen- 
tral feature in shaping legal principles. For a good example of this tendency, see Carrio, 
Professor Dworkin's Views on Legal Positivism, 55 IND. L.J. 209 (1980). See also Rich- 
ards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common 
Law and Constitutional Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069, 1095 (1977), and Dworkin's 
response in R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  338, 344-45. 
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their examples fail to grasp the distinction, Dworkin says: 
The difference between an argument of principle and an 
argument of policy, then, is a difference between two kinds of 
questions that a political institution might put to itself, not a 
difference in the kinds of facts that can figure in an answer. If 
an argument is intended to answer the question whether or not 
some party has a right to a political act or decision, then the 
argument is an argument of principle, even though the argu- 
ment is thoroughly consequentialist in its detail.aa 
Here, Dworkin is assuming that the nature of the argument in 
response to a question respects the nature of the question raised. 
That the nature of an argument determines its character is clear 
from Dworkin's earlier assertion that an "argument is an argu- 
ment of principle if it respects the distributional requirements of 
such arg~rnents.'"~ If, however, arguments of principle can be 
substituted for arguments of policy by changing the nature of 
the argument, then that seriously questions the usefulness of the 
distinction. Dworkin has an answer: "But it is a fallacy to sup- 
pose that because some argument of principle can always be 
found to substitute for an argument of policy, it will be as co- 
gent or as powerful as the appropriate argument of policy would 
have been."" In short, a strong argument of policy (appropriate 
for consideration by a legislature) when converted to an argu- 
ment of principle might not bear as much weight against com- 
peting arguments of principle in resolving a judicial dispute. 
Treating the relationship between principles and policies in 
this way raises at least two major difficulties. First, how and 
where does one draw the line between arguments of principle 
and arguments of policy in any practical sense? If the difference 
is anything more than simply a matter of form, how do the in- 
terests or considerations involved affect this question?a6 Second, 
and perhaps more poignant to the concerns of this essay, what is 
one to make of Dworkin's claim that there is a tendency for an 
argument of policy to lose force when converted to an argument 
22. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 297. 
23. Id. at 100. 
24. Id. at 96. 
25. Greenawalt makes this criticism and suggests that if the difference depends on 
the kinds of interests involved, it remains too diflicult to identify those interests count- 
ing for arguments of principle or arguments of policy to make the principles-policies 
distinction useful. Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 1020-26. Perhaps Dworkin's recognition 
of this difEiculty is one reason why he gives the name "Hercules" to the judge confronting 
a "hard case." See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 81-130. 
844 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
of principle? One commentator, Regan, has added an interesting 
and somewhat clarifying explanation: Policy arguments resting 
on broad social considerations when converted to individuated 
claims do not carry the same weight as those rights that function 
primarily as trump rights, such as freedom of expre~sion.'~ Al- 
though this difficult and complex point deserves further analy- 
sis, it is sutlicient now to note how this idea sharply reduces the 
role of the court in shaping and considering policy considera- 
tions, in contrast to familiar contemporary perceptions of judi- 
cial respon~ibility.~~ 
The foregoing clarifies the relation of Dworkin's principles- 
policies distinction to his rights thesis. We may now examine 
some of the implications of the rights thesis and the principles- 
policies distinction for the relationship between the legal order 
and the moral order. Admittedly, this question is not considered 
by Dworkin as he unfolds his theory. Yet, if the rights thesis 
continues to grow in influence, the question will become increas- 
ingly important. 
A. Moral . Order Affecting the Legal Order 
How can the moral order affect the legal order in Dworkin's 
model, in which judges are restricted to considering principles to 
enforce "existing" rights? Doesn't Dworkin reject the "social 
rule theory" of the positivists, which posits that social norms of 
behavior shape the sense of obligation underlying a legal sys- 
tem?- Dworkin addresses this issue and defends his thesis by 
explaining that the principles-policies distinction does not deny 
what he calls the "anthropological thesis'? 
26. Regan, supra note 2, at 1233. 
27. Greenawalt's criticisms of Dworkin reflect a widely held view that courta do not, 
and should not, "totally [exclude] from judicial consideration broad classes of arguments 
that would obviously be of weight for conscientious legislators dealing with a social prob- 
lem." Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 993. See also Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935). One is also reminded of the influence of the so-called 
"Yale School" of policy science. See Schwa&, The Law and Behavioural Science Fro- 
gram at Yak: A Sociologist's Account of Some Experiences, 12 J .  LEGAL EDUC. 91 
(1959). 
28. See Dworkin's broad attack on the "social rule theory" of H.L.A. Hart and other 
positivists in R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 46-80. 
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It may be entirely reasonable to think, as this [anthropological] 
thesis provides, that the principles the members of a particular 
community find persuasive will be causally determined by the 
collective goals of that community . . . . 
. . . .  
The distinction [between principles and policies] presup- 
poses,* that is, a further distinction between the force of a par- 
ticular right within a political theory and the causal explana- 
tion of why the theory provides that right? 
Thus, Dworkin accepts that collective goals may shape commu- 
nity principles, though he provides no argument why that causal 
connection must necessarily exist. In fact, he does not show why 
the causal connection might not work in the opposite dire~tion.'~ 
By defining the rights thesis in this manner, Dworkin ac- 
commodates the conclusions of those who explain legal develop- 
ment in terms of social goals.s1 But this accommodation is only 
partial; he still limits the courts' access to considerations of pol- 
icy. Thus, they cannot be creative in relating individual values 
to social values in the form of collective goals. This conservative 
consequence is inherent in Dworkin's doctrine of political re- 
sponsibility for judges and in his democratic theory. He places 
full responsibility for initiating legal norms from policy consider- 
ations in the legislature. Dworkin focuses primarily on the judi- 
ciary in expounding his rights thesis and narrows his interest 
even further by staying "within the enterprise" of the judiciary 
and showing little interest in the source of the values for their 
arguments of principle. The "anthropological thesis" does not 
explain so much as it simply narrows the focus and dilutes any 
socially dynamic picture of the rights thesis.s2 
B. Legal Order Affecting the Moral Order 
More interesting than Dworkin's attitude toward the ways 
29. Id. at  94-95. 
30. Id. at  94. 
31. Dworkin deals with the historical analysis of riparian rights developed by Hor- 
witz in M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). R. DWORKIN, supra 
note 1, at 297-301. He asserts that the historical analysis, in terms of social goals, is not 
inconsistent with his "story of principle" of how judges decide cases. He uses the same 
technique in reacting to the economic analysis of R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
(1972). R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  97-98. 
32. See text accompanying note 84 inftcr, which describes how Dworkin does provide 
some dynamic between the moral intuition of the judge and general moral theory by 
analogy to Rawls' concept of "reflective equilibrium." 
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moral norms might influence law is the question of how legal 
norms might in turn influence the moral order. Dworkin does 
not directly address this question. He recognizes that legal 
norms may affect moral norms under his rights thesis, but goes 
no further.88 However, inherent in Dworkin's development of a 
normative theory of fundamental rights, and particularly in his 
most fundamental right of "equal concern and respe~t , ' '~  is the 
strong wish to influence and shape not only legal but also social 
values. As will be seen, Dworkin places the judiciary in a central 
role in the articulation of moral argument.a6 This aspect of his 
theory makes examination of how his legal order might affect 
the moral order of promising value. 
On this question, one can see aspects of Dworkin's general 
theory pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is a 
picture of a legal system somewhat self-enclosed and potentially 
static and reactive. On the other, there are elements pointing 
toward a limited dynamic that can account for change. The 
static image tends to follow from the descriptive part of the the- 
ory found in the rights thesis,* including the principles-policies 
distinction and in particular the deontological-teleological fea- 
ture described earlier. The dynamic image tends to follow from 
the normative effort to develop the content of fundamental 
rights and from the methodological feature emphasizing the role 
of argument noted above. In taking this Janus-like approach, 
one is reminded of Fuller's attack on Kelsen, in which he ac- 
cused Kelsen of offering a static image of the legal system while 
proclaiming the dynamic aspects of his own system.a7 
1. The self-enclosed, static image 
The heart of the rights thesis, which forms the framework of 
Dworkin's conceptual model of a legal system, focuses on rights 
which "trump" collective goals. Since it is a rights-based theory, 
33. See note 36 and accompanying text infra. 
34. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 150-83. Here, Dworkin makes use of 
Rawls to evolve this fundamental abstract right, which becomes the foundation for other 
rights. 
35. See, e.g., id. at 129. 
36. Consider the attack by Hare on descriptivists who, in the guise of description, 
include terms that also carry evaluative weight. See R. HARE, ESSAYS ON THE MORAL 
CONCEPTS 55-75 (1972). Dworkin's reliance on the courts' use of "principles" might mis- 
leadingly suggest a normative attitude as well. 
37. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 114 (1940). 
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only competing rights can limit rights?@ In this way, arguments 
of principle are self-contained, or deontological. In other words, 
the validity of an argument of principle rests on its own strength 
without regard to any considerations of a collective goal of 
society. 
The Dworkin model focuses primarily on the process of ad- 
judication of these rights. In that process, courts characteristi- 
cally are, and should be, limited to considerations of principle. 
Furthermore, the model is based on a coherence theory in which 
Dworkin's ideal judge, "Hercules," pursues arguments that are 
the most consistent with principles or legal precedents justified 
by principle: "Hercules must discover principles that fit, not 
only the particular precedent to which some litigant directs his 
attention, but all other judicial decisions within his general juris- 
diction and, indeed, statutes as well, so far as these must be seen 
to be generated by principle rather than policy."s@ Notice that 
the process is primarily one of discovery rather than invention.'O 
The emphasis is on consistency in an overall coherent pattern. 
In the institutional setting of the legal system, a judge must rec- 
ognize the "gravitational force" of legal precedent because the 
idea of "fairness requires the consistent enforcement of rights.'"l 
Thus, according to Dworkin, this comprehensive legal universe 
or "seamless web,'"% which includes constitutional principles 
and even background rights," is held together and governed by 
the force of coherent argument. 
Dworkin further argues that "familiar legal systems" char- 
acteristically recognize one right answer for each legal question, 
even in hard cases. This is certainly a controversial claim. 
Dworkin defends his one-right-answer thesis by pointing out 
that the no-right-answer thesis is invalid because it is based on 
"truth conditions . . . independent of human convention. . . . 
38. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  194-95. There are further refinements in Dworkin's 
model, involving distinctions between institutional and background rights and between 
abstract and concrete rights, which are not important for the present discussion. 
39. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, a t  116. 
40. Dworkin admits to heavy reliance on this characterization. Id. at 280. 
41. Id. at 116. 
42. Dworkin even uses the phrase as his ideal judge, Hercules, addresses a "hard 
case." Id. at 115. 
43. "Background rights" back up the institutional rights explicitly recognized by the 
legal system. Though in their abstract form they do not provide a basis for claims to 
specific institutional decisions, background rights should be used to fulfill the meaning 
and purpose of institutional rights. Dworkin extends the doctrine of political responsibil- 
ity even to background rights. See id. at 93, 101-05. 
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[Wlithout some special truth conditions, which enable us to re- 
sist the inference that if a proposition is not true then it is false, 
the no-right-answer thesis cannot be maintained at all."" Dwor- 
kin asserts that the enterprise conducted by a judge is based on 
the truth conditions which permit assertion or denial of the 
truth of a proposition of law.'Vhis is part of the structure of a 
conventional normative system which Dworkin has styled a 
"constructive" model carrying its own reality in the world rather 
than a "natural" model providing a test for the validity of law 
external to the positive legal system.46 Of course, Dworkin recog- 
nizes that rights can be controversial and that reasonable minds 
may differ in hard cases." Accordingly, he offers a theory of mis- 
takes to account for inconsistent patterns of developing legal 
pre~edent.'~ Dworkin's arguments to these conclusions are long 
and at times difficult. Their metaphysical complexities and 
ramifications qualify for separate treatment.'@ However, the na- 
ture and importance of the one-right-answer thesis for Dworkin 
is now clear enough for our purposes.s0 
One characteristic of Dworkin's theory of particular signifi- 
cance to legal sociologists is that it is not empirical. It does not 
rest on the occurrence of a social fact or event. I t  undertakes to 
explain, particularly in hard cases, the existence of rights that 
cannot be attributed to an enacting event in the form of a rule, 
command or holding of a specific case. This view has been a fre- 
quent source of objection and perhaps misunderstanding on the 
part of Dworkin's critics, whom Dworkin thematically criticizes 
as trying to adapt positivism to include principles as part of the 
existing furniture of a legal system."' 
44. R. DWORKRY, supra note 1, at 289-90. 
45. Id. But see Temin, Toward an Account of the Truth of Propositions of Law, 49 
U .  CIN. L. REV. 341 (1980). Temin argues that Dworkin is implicitly constructing a realist 
account of the truth of propositions of law. There is little in Taking Rights Seriously to 
support this thesis and much in Dworkin's constructive model to discredit it. 
46. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 159-68. 
47. See id. at 279-90. 
48. Id. at 121-23. 
49. See id. at 279-90. 
50. See Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects of Self-Reference in Dworkin's 
Rights Thesis, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 371 (1980). Farago attacks Dworkin's one-right-answer 
thesis and further claims that in any event it is not necessary or useful to the rights 
thesis. One basis for this position is his rejection of a coherence model with a "common 
metric" to permit comparison of all competing principles. Id. at 388. At one point Farago 
suggests that "uncertainty is in some ways vital to our very conception of what law is." 
Id. at 381. 
51. This is the crux of his response to Richards. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 338- 
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I do want to reject, however, the picture of existing law I 
described earlier. . . . They [positivists] think that the law of 
a community is a distinct collection of particular rules and 
principles (and heaven knows what else) such that it is a sensi- 
ble question to ask whether, at any given moment, a particular 
rule or principle belongs to that col lect i~n.~~ 
Furthermore, Dworkin rejects the positivists' reliance on 
what he calls a "pedigree" test for determining what the "ex- 
isting law" of a legal system is. In fact, he rejects any test a t  
all." These positions limit the usefulness of analyzing a legal 
system on the basis of empirical observation or at least counsel 
caution in drawing conclusions from such observation. Dworkin 
thinks that to observe and analyze a line of cases in terms of 
changing community goals is interesting and (under his antropo- 
logical thesis) of some value, but it is essentially backward look- 
ing. Forward-looking projections of change in legal values would 
at best involve small steps as the ideal judge, Hercules, struggles 
to locate existing rights in a complex and coherent legal system. 
Dworkin seems to want to de-emphasize the conservative conse- 
quences of this model by insisting that "the main force of the 
underlying argument of fairness is forward looking, not back- 
ward 10oking."~ Unfortunately, he does not explain furtherP 
The distinctive responsibility for moral and legal argument 
assigned to the adjudication process suggests an autonomy to 
the legal system that fits strikingly with what Unger has referred 
to as the "legal ~ r d e r . " ~  For Unger, the legal order is the third 
of three concepts of law which tend to follow an evolutionary 
pattern among societies. "The legal order emerged with modern 
European liberal society"67 and has the following characteristics: 
"Law as legal order is committed to being general and autono- 
mous as well as public and positive. Autonomy has a substan- 
45. Dworkin makes the same point in response to criticism from Sartorius and Raz. Id. at 
64-68, 71-80. 
52. Id. at 343. 
53. See id. at 59-64. 
54. Id. at 118. 
55. See, e.g., Henkin, "Neutral Principles" and Future Cases, in h w  rn PHILOSO- 
PHY 301 (S. Hook ed. 1964). Henkin defends Wechsler's call for principled decisions by 
explaining that a constitutional principle must have some degree of "predictive general 
applicability." Id. at 306. Dworkin may intend nothing more than this by his use of the 
term "forward looking." 
56. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN S o c m  47 (1976). 
57. Id. at 54. 
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tive, an institutional, a methodological, and an occupational as- 
pect."" Dworkin insists on the autonomy of the legal system 
with even more optimism than UngerY This is especially visible 
in Dworkin's treatment of how his ideal judge handles 
legislation: 
If a judge accepts the settled practices of his legal system-if 
he accepts, that is, the autonomy provided by its distinct con- 
stitutive and regulative rules-then he must, according to the 
doctrine of political responsibility, accept some general politi- 
cal theory that justifies these practices. The concepts of legisla- 
tive purpose and common law principles are devices for apply- 
ing that general political theory to controversial issues about 
legal rights? 
In his theory of statutory interpretation when a statute is the 
result of policy determination, Dworkin makes a distinction be- 
tween the "gravitational force" of judicial precedent and legisla- 
tion based on principles and the "enactment force" of judicial 
precedent and legislation based on policy." Dworkin does not 
agree that the judge's responsibility in a hard case is to supple- 
ment the legislative act with a determination of what the legisla- 
ture would have done if it had been aware of the problem.62 This 
is a form of judicial discretion that he rejects. Instead, Hercules 
must construct a larger political theory which is able to account 
for the legislative purpose within the coherence demands of that 
theory. 
What, then, are the limits of judicial interpretation of the 
enactment force of a statute? Dworkin offers only the language 
of the statute and whatever reasonable limits it provides." Such 
a sharp division of responsibility presents difficulties in account- 
ing for legislative expectations (or express mandates) that courts 
58. Id. at 52. 
59. One of Unger's particular concerns is the inherent potential of an autonomous 
legal order to be unduly influenced by special interests that tend to undermine its gener- 
ality and autonomy. See id. at  197. This picture contrasts sharply with Dworkin's view 
that the legal system emphasizes the moral values of society and tends to protect indi- 
vidual rights. Dworkin says that the legislator-politician is better suited under the theory 
of democracy for weighing considerations of policy, not for reasons of expertise, "but 
rather [because] it puts him under weighta of political pressure from which the judge is 
rightly immune." R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 324. 
60. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at  105 (emphasis added). 
61. See id. at 110-15. See also Dworkin's response to Greenawalt's criticism. Id. at 
318-30. 
62. Id. at 109. 
63. Id. at 109-10. 
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take account of changing policy considerations in applying a 
statute. 
The individual judge in this model plays a large and central 
role in articulating the moral order of a s o ~ i e t y . ~  He does not 
defer to others, for "Hercules' technique encourages a judge to 
make his own judgments about institutional rights."@' Of course, 
he is fallible and subject to the theory of mistakes; but, Dworkin 
argues, "There is no reason to credit any other particular group 
with better facilities of moral argument . . . ."@@ The impact of 
this assertion cannot be ignored. The group holding such respon- 
sibility is presumably itself an elite subgroup of the priesthood 
of lawyers from whose ranks judges are selected. If it turns out 
that this group does not exhibit such superior skills for moral 
argument, Dworkin's solution is to improve the selection process 
for judges?' Another more modest argument for why judges 
should not defer to others is available: The doctrine of political 
responsibility of the judge includes the right of a party to have 
his institutional rights proclaimed by the legal system without 
any delegation of responsibility. 
Thus, the limitations on the kinds of considerations appro- 
priate for a nonempirically based coherence theory of adjudica- 
tion, the relative autonomy of the legal system, and the central 
role played by the judge in articulating rights in a rights-based 
theory all suggest a self-enclosed, autonomous system whose 
normative effect on other aspects of society is indirect at  best. 
2. The dynamic image 
By contrast, Dworkin does provide some sense of the dy- 
namic in the conceptual part of the rights thesis. He attempts to 
change and expand our vision of the legal system by asking us to 
shift our focus to the individual as the holder of rights and to 
adopt the methodology of moral argument. The image that 
Dworkin consciously tries to foster of his legal system is in- 
64. One interesting and usem byproduct of Dworkin's focus on the judicial role is 
the importance he attaches to the written opinion and its intended meaning. By compar- 
ison, American realist. and sociological jurisprudents have left a legacy of skepticism as 
to the precedential weight to be given to the articulated reasons in a legal opinion. Dwor- 
kin's model could lead to more directness, and perhaps even optimism, in understanding 
judicial efforts in hard cases. 
65. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 130. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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tended to alleviate the system's potential for self-enclosure 
[I980 
in its 
operation." For example, the positivists' theory of law as sketch- 
ed by H.L.A. Hart is from an external perspective-what does a 
legal system look like? This may seem to accommodate a social 
theory of law better than the internal perspective dominating 
Dworkin's focus on the process of judicial decision-making 
"within the enterpri~e."~~ Dworkin tries to ward off this con- 
clusion by seizing on the positivists' insistence on a sharp 
separation of law and morals and then comparing his theory 
which "uses reasoning about social obligations as the model for 
reasoning about legal obligations. But it also, and independently, 
provides for a more intimate connection between these 
 institution^."^^ 
The rights thesis does provide for the consideration of fun- 
damental moral values of a society in the form of "background 
rights."71 While background rights do not in the abstract provide 
the basis for a claim to a concrete institutional right, they can 
and should come into play in at least two kinds of cases. First, in 
a "hard case" an institutional right clearly dispositive of the case 
does not exist. There the judge must construct a larger theory 
including abstract and background rights to find the right an- 
swer that best fits within the coherence model.72 Second, the le- 
gal system often provides rules and principles which by their 
terms make moral values in the form of background rights rele- 
vant. The best example of a means by which the legal order par- 
ticipates in a changing moral order can be found in Dworkin's 
treatment of constitutional adjudication. He distinguishes be- 
tween a "concept" such as due process, equal protection, or cruel 
and unusual punishment, and a particular "conception" of that 
concept. The founding fathers can be said to have laid down a 
concept in full expectation that the concept will accommodate 
68. I have heard Dworkin in a lecture express concern over the danger that his the- 
ory in its descriptive aspects "may lead to excess screening out of 'background rights' in 
shaping and articulating 'institutional rights.' " Address by Ronald Dworkin, New York 
University Law School (Oct. 13,1975). This comment discloses how much reliance Dwor- 
kin places on the role of "background rights" to provide the means by which fundamen- 
tal values of a society influence established institutional rights. 
69. This is essentially the position spelled out in Mandel, Dworkin, Hart, and the 
Problem of Theoretical Perspective, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 57 (1979). 
70. Dworkin, Philosophy and the Critique of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 154 (R. 
WOW ed. 1971). 
71. See note 52 supra. 
72. See R. DWORKIN, supm note 1, 105-23. 
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changing conceptions because of changing social  condition^.^' 
This distinction is useful to describe certain kinds of legal norms 
which invite change in their moral content. However, it is not 
clear how much of a leadership role the judiciary should be per- 
mitted in effecting such a change. 
Dworkin also projects a generative view of how the moral 
order can be affected through the use of legal argument. The 
rights thesis centers on moral principles that underlie commu- 
nity institutions, not just references to a community consensus 
or belief at a particular time on a particular issue: "Whether a 
principle is a principle of the community in this sense would be 
a matter for argument, not report, though typically the weight of 
the principle, not its standing, would be at  issue."74 The method 
of argument to be used by a judge is analogous to the concept of 
"reflective equilibrium" used by Rawls and favored by Dworkin. 
Working within a coherence model that is constructive in na- 
ture, a judge argues back and forth between his moral intuition 
and a general moral theory until he reaches a satisfactory result. 
This result is ultimately limited by the judge's ability to articu- 
late its coherence with a moral theory held throughout the com- 
munity. Nevertheless, it is still shaped in part by the individual 
intuition or conviction of the judge16 
In normative terms, Dworkin does show some interest in 
change effected by the legal order. The legislature is free to initi- 
ate change in legal norms on the basis of either principle or pol- 
icy. But Dworkin's central focus is on the judiciary, and his rec- 
ognition of the role of fundamental rights is as a protection 
against the majority. Given this focus and recognition, the judi- 
ciary seems to play the central role in shaping of a moral order 
to the extent that it is grounded in principles rather than collec- 
tive goals. 
In terms of content, Dworkin examines Rawls' theory of jus- 
tice as fairness and finds the basic right of Rawls' "deep theory" 
to be the abstract fundamental right of equal concern and re- 
~ p e c t . ~ ~  This sense of equality focuses on respect as a human 
being, a kind of natural right in the Kantian sense, and not on 
73. See id. at 131-49. 
74. Id. at 79; The same point is made on behalf of Hercules. Id. at 129. 
75. For an explanation of Dworkin's use of the Rawls technique along these lines, 
see id. at 159-68. 
76. Id. at 178-83. 
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equality in the distribution of goods.77 Dworkin hints that such a 
fundamental right might be influential in holding together a 
moral order that is sdering from strains of heterogeneity? Un- 
fortunately, he has gone no further in exploring any systematic 
impact of his normative theory on the moral order. 
IV. THE REPLY 
Since the invitation said "RSVP-acceptance only" and 
gave no time limit for response, I shall only take it under advise- 
ment at this time. The foregoing analysis discloses a number of 
disquieting implications for the relationship between the legal 
order and the moral order.'@ The focus has been primarily on the 
conceptual or methodological aspects of the rights thesis, which 
is the strongest and potentially most influential part of Dwor- 
kin's theory.80 Admittedly, Dworkin's normative efforts at put- 
ting content into such concepts as "principles" and "background 
rights" have been tentative, and even his fundamental principle 
of "equal concern and respect" must be defended against com- 
peting views.81 
The preceding analysis of the conceptual framework of the 
rights thesis reveals three essential characteristics: (1) It is a 
constructive model in the tradition of idealism rather than em- 
piricism which places the individual at the center; (2) It places 
the judiciary in a central role in shaping fundamental legal and 
social values; and (3) It stresses primary reliance on the method- 
ology of moral argument in shaping those norms. 
A constructive, ideal model focused on the rights of individ- 
77. See id. at 182. 
78. The bulk of the law-that part which defines and implements social, eco- 
nomic, and foreign policy--cannot be neutral. I t  must state, in its greatest 
part, the majority's view of the common good. The institution of rights is 
therefore crucial, because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities 
that their dignity and equality will be respected. When the divisions among the 
groups are most violent, then this gesture, if law is to work, must be most 
sincere. 
Id. a t  205. 
79. For an interesting contrary conclusion, see Grifiiths, Is Law Important?, 51 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 339 (1979). 
80. Richards, supra note 2, a t  1331-38, agrees with this conclusion and characterizes 
Dworkin's rights thesis as a "methodological natural law theory." 
81. For example, how would Dworkin respond to the thesis of E. CAHN, THE SENSE 
OF INJUSTICE (1949)? Cahn persuasively argues that a sense of injustice or of inequality is 
a real phenomenon of our social condition and is much more efficacious in value-building 
than a sense of a positive content to justice and equality. 
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uals raises the questions of how efficaciously those rights will, in 
reality, be recognized and protected by political and social 
 institution^.^^ 
The heavy responsibility placed on the judiciary raises the 
question of how social values are to be incorporated into a po- 
tentially self-enclosed system. The anthropological thesis and 
ideas expressed in other writings of Dworkin suggest that the 
judiciary properly plays the leading interpretive role in assimi- 
lating social facts.= Perhaps in order to counteract overtones of 
elitism, Dworkin provides no basis for judicial authority inde- 
pendent of the strength of arguments made by the judges? This 
goes beyond rejection of a "pedigree" test for law and raises 
questions of constitutional and institutional perception, if not of 
normative constitutional values. 
Finally, what is disquieting about reliance on moral argu- 
ment? Nothing, unless it is at the rejection of other important 
considerations, such as accumulated experience. Hercules is not 
much impressed by accumulated experien~e.~~ He is limited by 
his capacity to articulate a concrete result in terms of institu- 
tional and background rights. Such a form of rationalism with- 
out the correctives of realism and empiricism is disquieting? A 
recent example of taking an even stronger position than Dwor- 
kin has explicitly taken on the function of moral argument is the 
work of Fried. He asserts that the way to understand legal 
change is to understand moral arguments rather than history be- 
cause "moral arguments can provide the backbone of a social 
theory."" He concludes, "Explanatory social theory merges with 
normative moral dis~ourse."~ Such a position has the virtue of 
82. See, e.g., S. SCHEINGOLD, THEPOLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974). Scheingold thinks that 
courts often help create a "myth of rights" by asserting rights which can be made real 
only by a political redistribution of power. 
83. Dworkin stresses this interpretive role for judges in Dworkin, Social Sciences 
and Constitutional Rights-the Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3 (1977). 
84. The idea that the authority of the law, especially the Constitution, resides in the 
law itself is supported by Robison, The Functions and Limits of Legal Authority, in 
AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 112 (R. Harris ed. 1976). 
85. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 318. 
86. See Adam, The Philosophical Grounds of the Present Crisis of Authority, in 
AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 3 (R. Harris ed. 1976). 
87. Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal His- 
tory, 9 J .  LEGAL STUD. 335, 345 (1980). 
88. Id. at 349. 
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simplicity and directness of method but asks us to risk too much 
in abandoning social theories which have proved useful in un- 
derstanding how legal systems function in society. 
